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In the last decade, a gulf opened up between England and Wales and Scotland as regards the 
use of stop and search. From a position of near parity in 2005/6, by 2012/13 recorded search 
rates in Scotland exceeded those in England and Wales seven times over. This divergence is 
intriguing on several counts, not least the fact that until the advent of the single police service 
in April 2013, the use of stop and search in Scotland remained low profile (Scott 2015, p. 21). 
The divergence is also fascinating given the similarities between the two jurisdictions, both in 
terms of recorded crime trends (Bradford 2015) and statutory stop and search powers. There 
are, of course, differences in police governance and the political narratives around policing in 
the two jurisdictions; nonetheless, it is arguable that the demands placed on the police and the 
legal powers to deal with these are broadly similar.  
 
Against this background, this paper investigates the variation in stop and search practice 
between England and Wales, and Scotland. The aim is to show how ‘top-down’ factors, such 
as substantive powers of search, regulations and scrutiny, can influence police practice. Such 
‘constraining’ factors can be taken for granted. For example, Kinsey observes a tendency ‘to 
ignore the efficacy of rules almost entirely’ (1992, p. 478, cited in Dixon, 1997, p. 21). 
Similarly Dixon observes that the law is ‘often regarded as being, at best, marginally relevant 
and, at worst, a serious impediment to the business of policing’ (ibid. p. 9, McConville et al. 
1991). Rather, the way in which officers deviate from, or modify rules and regulations tends 
to be viewed as the principal difficulty (McBarnet 1983, pp. 3-5). To be clear, the analysis in 
this article is not intended to downplay the discretionary nature of policing; the fact that 
reform and regulation around stop and search has been patchy, and at times, ineffective 
demonstrates the inherent difficulties in controlling police discretion. Nonetheless, we would 
suggest that by comparing policy and practice in England and Wales with that of Scotland, 
the value of legal and quasi-legal rules, as well as robust scrutiny, becomes clearer.   
 
The paper takes a comparative case-study approach in order to explore differences in stop and 
search practices and regulation in the two jurisdictions. The paper argues, first, that a 
permissive regulatory environment facilitated the development of volume stop and search in 
Scotland. Second, that the divergence between the two jurisdictions can also be attributed to 
varying levels of political and public scrutiny; to the fact that the stop and search agenda in 
England and Wales is established, whereas scrutiny in Scotland is in its infancy. Whilst it is 
clear that stop and search operates in a discretionary environment in both jurisdictions, the 
salient point is that a weak regulatory framework, coupled with a lack of scrutiny or political 
engagement enabled police practice in Scotland (Sanders and Young 2008, p. 284). The 
significance of these arguments is brought to the fore by the Scottish policy direction circa 
2007 onward: by the target-driven ‘proactive’ volume approach initially adopted by 
Strathclyde police force, and latterly rolled out nationally following the move to a single 
force in 2013.  
 
The paper draws on published statistics and data accessed via the Freedom of Information 
(Scotland) Act 2002 (FOISA). Note that there is a contrast between access to data in England 
and Wales and Scotland, which reflects our observations apropos standards of accountability 
and transparency in the two jurisdictions. England and Wales have been required to publish 
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annual data under the Criminal Justice Act 1991, s.95 on the criminal justice system and race 
since 1992, albeit in varying forms, as well as Home Office statistics on police powers 
(Police Powers and Procedures data series). The statistics detail, by police force area, the 
number of stops and searches, the reason for the search, the legislation used (broadly 
grouped), the number of resulting arrests, the self-defined ethnicity of the person searched 
and rates of stop and search per 1,000 of the population, including by ethnicity. Twenty-two 
forces also provide data sets on their websites (HMIC 2013). In Scotland, prior to 2014, the 
main vehicle for data has been the FOISA. In May 2014 the Scottish Police Authority (SPA) 
took responsibility for the publication of stop and search statistics (SPA 2014), although the 
only statistics presented thus far lack detail and are not tabulated (see SPA 17/12/2014). 
Since June 2014, Police Scotland have published statistics online (tabulated and 
disaggregated) which detail search location, reason for the search, whether statutory or non-
statutory, outcome (positive or negative) ethnicity, age and gender. Additional data fields 
were introduced in June 2015, including grounds for suspicion, legislation used and disposal 
(excluding arrest). Data quality is poor in both jurisdictions, arguably more so in Scotland: in 
March 2015 HMICS stated that they had no confidence in data collected by Police Scotland. 
Nonetheless, a comparison can be drawn which provides insight into the different thresholds 
of suspicion in each jurisdiction. As Scott explains:    
 
‘The disparity with England serves to illustrate the scale of the practice in Scotland, which 
was principally driven by the use of non-statutory stop and search. Stripping out potentially 
distorting features and inaccuracies, the statistics still demonstrate that the practice has been 
used proportionately more per head of population in Scotland than elsewhere.’ (2015, p. 19). 
 
The paper focuses on stop and search powers that can be exercised against people (and, 
where relevant, vehicles and vessels) when they are in public. It does not concern powers 
under the various Road Traffic Acts. As noted by the Canadian Supreme Court, which, in this 
context, operates within a broadly analogous human rights structure as the UK, the former 
involve interference with the ‘ordinary right of movement of the individual’, whereas the 
latter is ‘a licensed activity that is subject to regulation and control for the protection of life 
and property’ (Dedman v R (1983) 46 CR (3d) 193 para 72). Similarly, people are subject to 
more stringent and onerous conditions of passage at borders and so such stop and search 
powers (including those exercisable at airports) are not discussed.  
 
Unless otherwise stated, all references to police forces in England and Wales are to the 43 
Home Office forces. In April 2013, the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act, 2012 
amalgamated the eight Scottish police forces1 into the Police Service of Scotland (‘Police 




1. Police powers to stop and search in England and Wales and Scotland 
 
There are striking similarities in the underlying powers of stop and search in England and 
Wales and Scotland, with the statutory powers being virtually identical. The vast majority are 
                                                 
1 These were: Strathclyde, Lothian and Borders, Central, Fife, Tayside, Grampian, Northern, Dumfries and Galloway. 
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subject to reasonable suspicion and tend to follow a similar formula: the police may stop and 
search a person if they reasonably suspect an offence has, is, or is about to be committed, or 
that the person is in possession of a prohibited article. Some powers extend to vehicles, 
drivers and passengers. It is notable first, that just over half of these suspicion-based statutory 
powers apply across the UK, with a further eight specific to England and Wales and nine 
relating to Scotland. Among these powers, which range from ‘core’ criminal offences such as 
possession of drugs or stolen property, to environmental and wildlife offences, there are only 
five significant differences between the jurisdictions. Of these, two relate to the ‘core’ 
criminal offences that constitute the overwhelming majority of stops in both jurisdictions. In 
England and Wales, the police may stop and search persons suspected of having articles for 
use in criminal damage and fraud (Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), s.1). In 
Scotland, the power to search for stolen goods includes searching for evidence of the 
commission of theft (Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982, s.60).2 There are a further two 
statutory suspicionless stop and search powers, so termed because they explicitly do not 
require that the officer suspect the person of a particular offence or of carrying prohibited 
items to stop and search them. These are the Terrorism Act 2000, s.47A and the Criminal 
Justice and Public Order Act 1994, s.60, which are UK wide. In 2015, Home Office forces 
accepted voluntary restrictions upon the use of s.60 under the Best Use of Stop and Search 
(BUSS) Scheme (see part two), thereby creating a cleavage between the jurisdictions. 
Specifically, a higher threshold is required for authorisation, the maximum duration of an 
authorisation has been reduced from 24 to 15 hours, and there is a requirement to inform the 
public after an authorisation has been issued and, where practicable, in advance (Home 
Office 2014, Lennon 2016).  
 
Statutory differences between England and Wales and Scotland cannot explain the marked 
variation in search rates between the jurisdictions. Rather, the main point of divergence 
relates to non-statutory (or ‘consensual’) stop and search, used only in Scotland. Premised 
nominally on consent, officers can undertake a non-statutory search when a person ‘is not 
acting suspiciously, nor is there any intelligence to suggest that the person is in possession of 
anything illegal’ (Police Scotland 2014, p. 8). In England and Wales, non-statutory stop and 
search has been prohibited in relation to juveniles and persons incapable of giving consent 
since 1990 (the latter being unlawful in any event),3 and across the board since 2003.4 In 
England and Wales, the Macpherson Report’s recommendation to record all searches 
prompted the ultimate demise of non-statutory search (Macpherson 1999: Recommendation 
61; see Sanders and Young 2007).  
 
The legality of non-statutory stop and search as practiced in Scotland is questionable (Scott 
2015, p. 45, Lennon 2016). It is trite law that consent must be freely given and fully 
informed. Thus, the person must be under no coercion, understand the potential consequences 
                                                 
2 In addition, Scotland has powers relating to offences involving areas subject to a special scientific interest notification (Nature 
Conservation (Scotland) Act 2004, s.43) and hunting wild animals with dogs (Protection of Wild Mammals (Scotland) Act 2002, s.7). 
England and Wales have powers relating to poaching offences (Poaching Prevention Act 1862, s.2). There are two further areas covered by 
each but in different ways. First, Scotland provides powers of stop and search to constables and water bailiffs in connection with offences 
relating to salmon and fishing, whereas only the latter have such powers in England and Wales (Salmon and Freshwater Fisheries 
(Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 2003, s.53 c.f. Salmon and Freshwater Fisheries Act 1975, s.31). Second, both grant constables’ power to 
stop and search persons or vehicles in relation to offences against deer, but in Scotland a warrant is the norm, with a requirement of urgency 
to search upon reasonable suspicion without a warrant (Deer (Scotland) Act 1996, s27(4)(b). C.f. Deer Act 1991, s.12(1)). 
3 PACE 1984 (Codes of Practice) (No. 2) Order 1990, SI 1990/2580. 
4 PACE (Codes of Practice) (Statutory Powers of Stop and Search) Order 2002, SI 2002/3075. See now Code A para.1.5. 
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of a search, that a search may be declined and that refusal will not of itself provide grounds 
for a statutory search nor trigger any other police action. In addition, the person must have the 
legal capacity to consent. In practice, these criteria are unlikely to be met in all cases. First, 
young children lack the capacity to consent. While the exact age at which a child has such 
capacity is ambiguous (see further Lennon 2016), it is clear that children under 8 years (the 
age of criminal responsibility) would not have the requisite capacity. It is questionable 
whether other young children would sufficiently understand the consequences of their action 
so as to be able to consent. As discussed in part two, non-statutory stop and search has fallen 
principally on young people, including children under the age of criminal responsibility. 
Persons under the influence of drugs or alcohol may also lack the capacity to consent.  
 
Second, the police are not legally required to inform the person who has been stopped that 
they can refuse the search. In Brown v Glen Lord Sutherland stated that ‘there appears to us 
to be no logical reason why [the police] should be obliged to issue any caution to accompany 
a request for a search to be carried out when it must be perfectly obvious that the answer to 
that request may be either yes or no’ ((1998) SLT 115: 117). Research, however, shows that 
it is often not ‘perfectly obvious’. Dixon et al. observed that ‘consent’ ‘frequently consists of 
acquiescence based on ignorance’ or due to the person’s ‘appreciation of the contextual 
irrelevance of rights and legal provisions’ (1990, p. 348). One officer they interviewed stated 
that '[a] lot of people are not quite certain that they have the right to say no. And then we, sort 
of, bamboozle them into allowing us to search' (ibid.). Leaving knowledge of one’s choice to 
refuse the request aside, the research raised the additional issue that agreement may be in be 
predicated on a conditioned response to police authority or a disbelief in one’s rights. It is 
doubtful whether such ‘acquiescence’, whatever its base, constitutes free, informed consent. 
‘Bamboozling’ a person through misinformation or pressure, implied or explicit, clearly does 
not. Moreover, the inherent power imbalance between the police and the person stopped may 
prompt people to consent ‘not because they make a free choice… but because that is how 
people respond to the authority of the police (Delsol 2006, p. 116). Third, research shows that 
refusal can lead to a statutory stop and search, which undermines consent (Murray 2014a, 
p.21).  
 
Routine stop and search engages the right to privacy under Article 8 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) (Gillan v United Kingdom (2010) 50 EHRR 45). In a 
non-statutory context, the questionable nature of the ‘consent’, at least in some cases, coupled 
with the virtually unfettered discretion of the officer regarding whom to search and the lack 
of information given to the person being stopped (or more generally available) makes it likely 
that the power is not prescribed by law. As this is a prerequisite for a justifiable infringement 
with the qualified rights under the ECHR, it is highly likely that non-statutory stop and search 
infringes Article 8 (Mead 2002, SHRC 2015, Lennon 2016. On stop and search and the 
ECHR generally, see: Lennon 2013a, 2015, 2016). The next part of the paper examines the 
significance of these observations, and shows how non-statutory stop and search provided a 
vehicle for policies that might, to some extent, be constrained by legal rules.      
 




The ascendency of New Public Managerialism in the 1980s, the embedding of performance 
management in policing under the 1997 New Labour administration, and the related impact 
on policing is widely established. For example, research has highlighted an overemphasis on 
outputs at the expense of outcomes, and shown how targets can detract from less tangible 
police-work (Fielding and Innes 2006, McLaughlin 2007). Specifically in relation to stop and 
search, a performance-driven approach can be traced in both jurisdictions, albeit unevenly. In 
England and Wales, the Metropolitan Police Federation have documented the use of targets 
by the Metropolitan Police (2014). However it is unclear to what extent the remaining Home 
Office forces appropriated targets, either formal or informal.  
 
Looking to the Scottish legacy forces, a distinction can be drawn between forces which used 
stop and search reactively, on a statutory basis and at an officer’s discretion, and those which 
adopted a proactive approach. The latter was spearheaded by Strathclyde, Scotland’s largest 
force (Murray 2015a).  From circa 2007, Chief Constable Sir Stephen House promoted 
volume stop and search in Strathclyde using numerical targets. For instance, the force was 
tasked with conducting 459,438 searches in 2013/14 (ibid.). Whilst Strathclyde contained 
highly challenging areas in terms of crime and relative deprivation (Scottish Government, 
2012), 2013) the number of searches seemed disproportionate: in 2010, Strathclyde 
accounted for 84% of recorded searches nationally, compared to a 43% share of the 
population and a 53% share of recorded offensive weapon handling and drug offences (ibid.). 
Most searches were undertaken on a non-statutory basis, which in effect, enabled a proactive 
policing approach, premised on deterrence rather than intelligence or suspicion. Put another 
way, officers used non-statutory tactics when the encounter seemed unlikely to result in 
detection (Murray 2015a).  
 
The move to a single force heralded significant changes in terms of governance and the 
profile of Scottish policing (Anderson, Fyfe and Terpstra 2014). Reform sought to re-balance 
power between the Chief Constable, the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Police 
Authority. In practice however, power coalesced around Sir Stephen House, the newly 
appointed Chief Constable, and Scottish Ministers (ibid.). Scottish policing was rapidly 
politicized’ (Reiner 2010, p. 33), that is, subject to an unprecedented degree of critical media 
and political attention. From April 2013, Police Scotland rolled out proactive stop and search 
nationally, resulting in sharp increases in areas that hitherto took a more discretionary 
approach. Stop and search was set as a closely monitored Key Performance Indicator and a 
detection target set at 20%. More generally, officers and supervisors were pressured to 
increase search numbers and be more ‘proactive’ (HIMCS 2015, p. 55).  
 
From 2014 the Westminster government introduced major reforms aimed at limiting the use 
of stop and search. In August 2014, the BUSS scheme launched in England and Wales. 
Although ‘voluntary’, the Home Secretary threatened to introduce legislation if the reform 
package, including the scheme, did not work (May 2014). Thirty-five of the forty-three Home 
Office forces implemented the BUSS scheme. The remainder partially implemented it, and, 
with the British Transport Police (BTP), committed to full implementation in 2015 (Home 
Office 2014). The BUSS scheme expanded the recording of outcomes and, as detailed in part 
1, restricted the use of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, s.60. The scheme also 
required that lay observers view the deployment of stop and search by officers, and provide 
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feedback, with a view to facilitating dialogue between the police and communities, and 
improving police-community relations. A ‘community complaints trigger’ aimed to clarify 
and expand on the complaints system, and could prompt forces to explain their use of the 
powers once a threshold (set by the force) is met.  
 
Police practice 
Comparative analysis between England and Wales, and Scotland reveals a marked disparity 
in the use of stop and search which principally relates to non-statutory practice in Scotland. 
Looking first at the raw counts (Home Office 2015, SS.01), the number of recorded searches 
in England and Wales peaked at over 1.5 million in 2008/9. In 2012/13, recorded searches 
fell to just over a million, and by 2013/14, recorded searches had fallen to below one million 
for the first time since 2005/6. A small minority are suspicionless: around 5,000 in 2012/13 
(0.5% of the total), down from a high of over 360,000 in 2008/09 (24% of the total). 
Significantly, since 2001, the primary driver of variation has been the use of suspicionless 
statutory powers. Between 2001/2 and 2010/11, officers recorded over 645,000 stop searches 
under the Terrorism Act 2000, s.44 (Home Office 2012). Its replacement, s.47A, has been 
authorised once in Northern Ireland, but not used in Great Britain to date (Anderson 2015). 
The use of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, s.60 has remained more constant, 
usually around 36,000 to 46,000 per year. However, use of s.60 tripled between 2007/08 and 
2008/09, rising to just over 150,000 before falling back to around 46,000 in 2011/12, and 
collapsing in 2012/13 to just under 5,000 and under 3,500 in 2013/14 (Home Office 2015, 
SS.01). This shift likely reflects changed policy from the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) 
announced in 2012 (Nick Herbert MP, 17 July 2012, HC vol.594 col.220WH), the (to date 
unsuccessful) legal challenge of R (Roberts) v Commission of Police of the Metropolis [2014] 
EWCA Civ 69 and, latterly, the implementation of the BUSS scheme.  
 
In Scotland, recorded searches increased by 550% between 2005 and 2012/13, from around 
105,000 to 683,000. In 2013/4 (the first year of Police Scotland) recorded searches fell by 6% 
to around 643,000, and then by 34% in 2014/15, to around 426,000 (Murray 2015a, 2015b). 
Between 2005 and 2014, around 70% of recorded searches were undertaken on a non-
statutory basis (Murray 2014a, HMICS 2015, p. 6). The absence of reliable data makes it 
impossible to assess the use of suspicionless statutory powers in Scotland. The Terrorism Act 
2000, s.44 was used, albeit ‘barely’, in Scotland (Anderson 2011, para.8.19), but no data on 
the usage have been published and an FOISA request was refused.  
 
In order to compare the two jurisdictions, Figure 1 shows per capita trends in England and 
Wales and Scotland between 2005/6 and 2014/15 (the population of England and Wales is 
nearly eleven times higher than Scotland).5 The figure shows how from a position of near 




                                                 











Source: Scottish Police Forces (FOISA); Police Scotland (2015b); Home Office (2014a) (Table SS.01 Stops and searches in England and Wales 
(excluding British Transport Police) by legislation).  
 
Notes: 
a) Population calculations based on ONS Mid-year estimates, 2005/6 to 2012/13  
b) 2013/14 and 2014/15 Scotland calculations based on 2012/13 estimates.  
c) There is a 3 month time lag in the England/Wales and Scotland data between 2005 and 2010. In this period, Scotland data were 
presented by calendar rather than financial year.  
d) Missing data: Dumfries and Galloway and Fife were unable to provide data between 2005/6 and 2009/10. Tayside was unable to 
provide data between 2005/6 and 2008/9. However, in the years for which these three forces provided data, they accounted for 2 to 
3 per cent of all searches in Scotland. As such, their commission is unlikely to affect the overall calculations.  
 
 
Figure 1 shows that by 2012/13 the per capita search rate in Scotland was seven times higher 
than England and Wales, at 129 and 18 searches per 1,000 people respectively. The main 
driver of variation was the increase in non-statutory stop and search in Scotland, coupled with 
the fall in suspicionless statutory stop and search in England and Wales. Despite falling rates 
of recorded searches from 2013/14 onwards, search rates in Scotland remained over four 
times higher than England and Wales in the nearest comparable period, at 80 and 16 stop 
searches per 1,000 people respectively. A comparison of search rates expressed in terms of 

















crimes was ten times greater in Scotland than England and Wales, at 2,377 and 238 
respectively. Put another way, Police Scotland recorded over twice as many stop searches as 
crimes.   
 
Per capita search rates varied within each jurisdiction. In England and Wales, these ranged 
from 5 per 1,000 in several forces, to 45 per 1,000 in Cleveland in 2013/14 (Home Office 
2015, SS.08). In the same period, search rates in Scotland ranged from 10 searches per 1,000 
in Aberdeenshire and Moray, to 310 per 1,000 in Greater Glasgow. In 2013/14, officers 
recorded 371 searches per 1,000 in Glasgow (Police Scotland 2014, p. 79), compared to 35 
per 1000 by the MPS (Home Office 2015, SS.08). In Scotland, the five Divisions with the 
highest search rates in 2013/14 (from 152 searches per 1,000 upwards) also had high rates of 
non-statutory stop and search, ranging from 63% in Argyll and West Dumbartonshire, to 76% 
in Ayrshire (Murray 2015b). 
 
There was some variation in the reasons for searching people (non-statutory searches in 
Scotland are assigned ‘reasons’, which are included in this comparison). The most common 
reason in both jurisdictions was drugs. Viewed as a straightforward win by officers (Bear 
2013), drugs accounted for 53% of recorded searches in England and Wales in 2013/14 
(Home Office 2015, SS.02), and 44% in Scotland (HMICS 2015, p. 13). Thereafter 
divergence occurred. For England and Wales, the second most common reason was stolen 
property (21%), followed by going equipped for criminal damage (14%), offensive weapons 
(7%), ‘other’ (covering the various other categories described in section one above, including 
suspicion of being a terrorist) (4%), criminal damage and firearms (both 1%) (Home Office 
2015, SS.02).  
 
In Scotland, alcohol was the second most cited reason (31%), although this statistic also 
included confiscations under Section 61 of the Crime and Punishment (Scotland) Act 1997.6 
Offensive weapons were the reason for 18% of recorded searches (2.5 times higher than 
England and Wales) and stolen property for 7% of searches. Others reasons, including 
firearms, accounted for less than 1% of searches. Overall, the distribution reflected a wider 
policy concern with serious disorder and binge-drinking (Audit Scotland/HMICS 2011, p. 38) 
or ‘blades and booze’ (Scottish Executive 2003). However not all forces translated the policy 
into stop and search, particularly those with lower rates of non-statutory search. For example, 
in Tayside and Northern, alcohol accounted for 1% and 3% of recorded searches respectively 
(REF*). 
 
It is not possible to compare the effectiveness of stop and search in terms of ‘hit-rates’. In 
England and Wales, this refers to the proportion of searches that result in an arrest. In 
2013/14, the arrest rate was 12% (Home Office 2015, SS.08). Given the absence of a 
requirement of suspicion, it is unsurprising to find the rate for suspicionless searches was 
lower, at 5%. In Scotland, detection constitutes the ‘hit-rate’. In 2013/14, the detection rate 
was 19%, although this was inflated by the (unquantified) inclusion of alcohol confiscations 
under s.61 (HMICS 2015, p. 43). There was also a significant difference in detection rates for 
statutory and non-statutory searches, at 28% and 16% respectively (ibid., p.3). There have 
                                                 
6 Alcohol searches and seizures were recorded separately from June 2015 onwards. The respective number of alcohol searches and seizures 
prior to this point is unknown. 
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been some attempts to portray low hit-rates as a ‘success’, as evidence that stop and search is 
functioning as intended by permitting the police to confirm or allay suspicion without 
recourse to arrest, or as evident of a deterrent effect (Murray 2015a). In a non-statutory 
context, the fact that there is no robust evidence to support a deterrent effect (Delsol and 
Shiner 2015) undermines the argument that low detection rates represent a successful 
outcome. Leaving the suspicionless powers to one side, Bowling’s argument that suspicion 
can hardly be ‘reasonable’ (and the stop therefore not lawful), when the suspicion is 
unfounded in the vast majority of cases is compelling (Bowling 2007).  
 
Some demographic differences are evident.7 In England and Wales, stop and search has long 
been associated with the disproportionate policing of black, Asian and minority ethnic 
(BAME) communities (Scarman 1981, Holdaway 1996, Macpherson 1999, EHRC 2010). In 
2011/12, in comparison with ‘White’ people, 'Black' people were six times more likely to be 
stopped and ‘Asian’ people and those of ‘mixed’ ethnicity were twice as likely to be stopped 
(Ministry of Justice 2013, p. 41). When the London forces are excluded the disproportionality 
remains, albeit at a lower level, with, respectively, ‘Black’, ‘Asian’ and ‘Mixed ethnicity’ 
persons being 2.8, 1.4 and 1.6 times more likely to be stopped than ‘White’ persons (ibid., p. 
42).  
 
In Scotland, searches have generally targeted white working-class boys (McAra and McVie 
2005, p. 28, Murray 2015, p. 284). Unlike England and Wales, ethnicity has not surfaced as a 
high-profile concern (Reid Howie 2001) although poor recording has precluded more robust 
conclusions. The age distribution is concerning. For example, in 2014/15, officers recorded 
more searches on sixteen year olds in Glasgow than the resident population of sixteen year 
olds (Murray 2015b). Equally problematic is searching very young children. In Scotland, 
officers recorded over 1,300 searches on children under ten between 2006 and 2010 (FOISA). 
The closest equivalent data for the Home Office forces is from the All Party Parliamentary 
Group on Children’s (APPG) report ‘Children and the Police’ (2014) which found that 1,136 
searches were recorded on children under ten between 2009 and 2013 across twenty-two 
forces (excluding the MPS).8 In Scotland, officers recorded 262 on children under ten in 
2013/14. Whilst these figures may include inputting errors,9 the Scottish annual figure is 
substantially higher than the three year total from the MPS,10 which recorded 101 searches on 
under ten year olds between November 2011 and October 2014 (FOI), despite the MPS 
having a force population 1.9 million greater than that of Police Scotland (SPA 2014, p. 10).  
 
Taking an overview, of the jurisdictions, the main points of similarity and divergence are as 
follows. First, a low hit-rate and focus on drugs is evident in both jurisdictions. There are 
however, several points of divergence. First, a strong focus on alcohol and weapons is 
apparent in some (but not all) parts of Scotland. Second, stop and search in Scotland has not 
coalesced around ‘race’ in the way that it has in England and Wales (Delsol and Shiner 2006, 
p. 244). Rather, criminalisation has hinged on social class and exclusion (Croall and 
                                                 
7 Space precludes a detailed consideration of gender. Whilst there is some evidence of males are searched disproportionately, this does not 
appear to be sizeable, compared to recorded data on gender and offending (Murry, 2015; p.150).  
8 The forces were: Avon and Somerset; Bedfordshire; Cambridgeshire; Cheshire; Cumbria; Derbyshire; Dorset; Essex; Gloucestershire; 
Gwent; Lancashire; Norfolk; North Wales; North Yorkshire; Staffordshire; Suffolk; Sussex; Thames Valley; Warwickshire; West Mercia; 
West Midland; West Yorkshire. 
9 See: APPG, 8; HMIC, 2015.  
10 The MPS force population is 1.9 million higher than the Police Scotland force population (SPA 2014, p.10). 
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Frondigoun 2010, p. 17). Whilst these criteria have been flagged in some English and Welsh 
research (Mooney and Young 1984, Jefferson and Walker 1992, Waddington et al., 2004), 
the narrative around class is stronger in Scotland. In part, this divergence stems from raw 
demographic differences (Bond 2006, p.14), and the smaller proportion of BAME people in 
Scotland. By far the most significant divergences between the two jurisdictions are the scale 
of stop and search in Scotland and the related use of non-statutory searches.  
 
 
3. Restraining factors: safeguards and regulation 
 
It is well documented that police cultures are resistant to legal rules and can, and do, subvert 
them. As Hawkins observes, rules are not ‘mechanically applied’ (1986, p.1164).  
Complicating the picture is the fact that stop and search is part of street policing where 
‘norms and practices of the street level police officer take priority over outside regulation’ 
(Young 1994, p. 14). Relatedly, both HMIC (2013, pp. 28-29) and HMIC (2015) have 
reported inadequate supervision over the encounter and the subsequent search record. It is 
therefore unsurprising that stops and searches are perennially under-recorded (Bland 2000, 
Murray 2015a); that when records are made they are incomplete; that not all officers were 
explaining the procedure or rights to the person stopped; and there are not always sufficient 
grounds for reasonable suspicion (HMIC 2013, ch. 6). Yet these observations do not suggest 
that legal rules have no effect (Holdaway 1989, Ericson 1993). This part of the paper 
investigates the legal and quasi-legal regulatory mechanisms in the two jurisdictions, and 
shows how a lack of safeguards and regulations further enabled a permissive climate in 
Scotland. The analysis examines three factors aimed at limiting police discretion – reasonable 
suspicion, officer conduct requirements, and recording practices – and reveals how these 
differ in the two jurisdictions.  
 
a) Reasonable suspicion 
Reasonable suspicion is one of the major safeguards against the arbitrary exercise of stop and 
search powers. In England and Wales, PACE Code A supplements the statutory 
requirements, providing additional detail on required conduct during stop and search 
encounters. A breach of the Code is a disciplinary offence and may be entered into evidence, 
but is of itself neither a criminal nor a civil wrong (PACE, ss.67(10)-(11)). Police Scotland is 
subject to the Code when stopping and searching under the Terrorism Act 2000 (Home Office 
2012, 2015b).   
 
Code A explains that the officer must have formed a genuine suspicion in their own mind and 
that reasonable suspicion must be based on objective grounds, whether facts, 
information/intelligence, or the behaviour of the person (Home Office 2015a, para.2.2). In 
Scotland, reasonable suspicion is set out in Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) as 
suspicion that is ‘backed by a reason capable of articulation and is something more than a 
hunch or a whim’ (2015c, p.10). This looser definition could encompass exclusively 
subjective grounds undermining the safeguarding role of reasonable suspicion. 
 
Both Code A and Police Scotland’s SOP state that reasonable suspicion cannot be based on 
personal factors such as age, gender, race or stereotypes (Home Office 2015, para.2.2B, 
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Police Scotland 2014, p. 6), but differ on the issue of prior convictions. Code A rejects their 
use, either alone or in combination with other factors (Home Office 2015, para.2.2B), whilst 
they are listed as a relevant factor in the SOP (Police Scotland 2014, p. 11). The Police 
Scotland position is based on Bett v Lees (1998) SLT 1069, although that the prior 
convictions were only one of two factors that, taken in conjunction, gave grounds for 
reasonable suspicion and that the case pre-dates the Human Rights Act 1998. In England and 
Wales, Code A permits personal factors relating to persons wearing gang insignia and 
particular organised protest groups in limited circumstances (Home Office 2015, para.2.6). It 
is unclear from the Police Scotland SOP whether these exceptions are permitted, for instance 
they may come within ‘suspects (sic) clothing’, although this appears to be more widely 
drawn (Police Scotland 2014, p. 6). Overall, Police Scotland’s SOP explanation of reasonable 
suspicion lacks clarity and detail. Code A’s explanation is more expansive and 
understandable for both officers and members of the public. However, the crucial issue 
relates to objective factors as the basis for suspicion, which is a necessary requirement in law, 
but not clearly defined in the SOP.  
 
Of course, reasonable suspicion remains an imperfect safeguard that is subject to different 
interpretations, primarily because of the layers of discretion involved. These include the 
officer’s discretion as to whether the circumstances amount to reasonable suspicion; their 
discretion as to whether to proceed against the person, given reasonable suspicion; and, the 
discretion afforded by the broad base offences (such as criminal damage) (Williams and Ryan 
1986, Bland et al. 2000). Research has consistently found that extraneous factors are taken 
into account when determining who to stop and search and that a proportion of the stops and 
searches do not meet the requisite standard (Bottomley 1991, Quinton et al. 2000, Quinton 
2011, HMIC 2013). Nonetheless, the value of reasonable suspicion is made clearer by the 
trends shown in figure 1. Across the jurisdictions, suspicionless searches fuelled the 
respective upward trends, more markedly so in Scotland, where authorization for non-
statutory stop and search is not required (in contrast to the statutory suspicionless powers) 
and officers are not restricted as to the items they can search for.   
 
b) Regulating conduct 
Rules and regulations pertaining to officer conduct and standards can also put limits on police 
discretion. In England and Wales, Code A (para. 3.8) requires officers to identify themselves, 
showing documentary evidence if not in uniform, provide their name – or warrant number in 
counter-terrorist stops or where giving their name may put the officer in danger – and station, 
the grounds for carrying out the search and the object of the search. The stringency of these 
requirements when challenged (albeit that such legal challenges are comparatively rare (see 
further Fielding 2005), is underlined by R v Christopher Bristol [2007] EWCA Crim 3214, 
where a police officer saw what he believed was a wrap of drugs in the appellant’s mouth 
and, without identifying himself or station, applied mandibular pressure and stated ‘drugs 
search, spit it out’. No drugs were found and a struggle ensued. The appellant was convicted 
of intentionally obstructing an officer in the execution of his duty and sentenced to twelve 
months imprisonment. His conviction was quashed upon appeal. The court pointed to the 
clear wording in the statute and that, notwithstanding the ‘emergency’ nature of the situation, 
it was not impracticable for the officer to state his name and station. These provisions apply 
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even where the officer and suspect are known to each other (R (Michaels) v Highbury Corner 
Magistrates’ Court [2009] EWHC 2928 (Admin)).  
 
Officer conduct in Scotland is less proscribed. An officer must identify themselves only if not 
in uniform. A person must be informed of the reason for the search for some powers (e.g. 
Criminal Law Consolidation (Scotland) Act 1995, ss.48 and 50), but not others (e.g. Civic 
Government (Scotland) Act 1982, s.60) thereby resulting in different standards of legal 
protection across similar powers. 
 
c) Recording practices 
Police accountability for stop and search depends on accurate recording. First, relevant and 
complete data are required in order to make stop and search transparent (through data 
publication) and to understand the impact on crime and the community, though scrutiny and 
analysis (HMIC 2013, p. 6, also Bichard 2004). Second, the provision of a ‘receipt’ enhances 
street level accountability by placing responsibility on individual officers. The onus to 
provide a receipt also means that officers may ‘think twice’ about using their powers (Bland 
et al. 2000). This focus on controlling discretion through post-hoc scrutiny (or 
‘bureaucracy’), especially through the recording of searches dominated the stop and search 
debate in England and Wales, particularly post-Macpherson (Flanagan 2008, Wilding 2008).  
 
In England and Wales, under PACE, s.3, officers must record every search made, including: 
the date, time and place; the name(s) of the officer(s) involved; the self-defined ethnicity of 
the person searched and, if different, the ethnicity as perceived by the officer; the grounds for 
and object of the search and whether the search resulted in an arrest. The BUSS scheme 
extended the recording requirements to specify one of seven outcomes, including cautions, 
penalty notices and community resolution in addition to arrests (Home Office 2014). This 
more nuanced ‘hit-rate’ aims to facilitate analysis of the link between the object of the search 
and its outcome and the effectiveness of the powers more generally. Officers must complete 
the search record on the spot, or as soon as reasonably practicable, and make a receipt 
available to the person searched. Officers cannot demand the person’s details short of arrest, 
and under the most recent iteration of Code A, should not ask for their details to complete the 
search form (Home Office 2015a, para.4.3A). 
 
The introduction of new recording procedures in June 2015 brought Scotland broadly in line 
with the Home Office forces. Previously, recording standards were ill-defined, unsystematic, 
and did not allow links to be made between the grounds for the search, powers used and the 
outcome. In March 2015, HMICS reported that the recording process lacked clarity, to the 
extent that it was unclear what a stop and search is, or how it should be recorded (2015, p. 5).  
In a statutory context, recording is underpinned by the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 
1995, s.13 which states that if a constable has reasonable grounds for suspecting that a person 
has committed or is committing an offence she may require the person to give their name, 
home address, date of birth, place of birth and nationality. These details, with the exception 
of name and address, are stored on the national stop and search database. In a non-statutory 
context, officers may ask, not demand, a person’s details. Whilst there is no duty on the 
person to provide these, officers are not required to inform the person of this fact. Consistent 
with Delsol’s observation that people consent ‘because that is how people respond to the 
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authority of the police’ (2006, p. 116), Police Scotland data (2015) indicates that most people 
give their details when asked. For example, people gave age details in virtually all negative 
non-statutory searches, despite no requirement to do so. Officers record some details not 
provided for in law. For example, HMICS (2015, pp. 76-77) found that officers recorded 
details as diverse as occupation and telephone numbers in their notebooks. Officers do not 
make a receipt available to the person searched, which limits street-level accountability. Also, 
those who have been searched cannot document the encounter, nor substantiate repeat search 
encounters (c.f. Delsol and Shiner 2006, p.255).  
 
Street powers of stop and search have inherently high levels of discretion (Young 1994). The 
challenge therefore is to provide multiple layers of accountability, through mechanisms such 
as those discussed here, together with robust supervision. In England and Wales, particularly 
since the introduction of the BUSS Scheme, accountability is factored in before the 
encounter, through requiring reasonable suspicion; during the encounter, by imposing duties 
on officers; and after the encounter, through post-hoc supervision and transparency. In the 
case of suspicionless statutory powers, the authorization process attempts to balance the 
greater ‘front-end’ discretion, exercised by the authorising officers, through heightened 
‘back-end’ discretion, exercised by the officer conducting the search (Ip 2013). Prior to 2015, 
these layers of accountability were not replicated in Scotland. Reasonable suspicion was 
absent in the majority of stops, few limits were placed on officer conduct, nor was the use of 
stop and search balanced by heightened ‘front-end’ or indeed post-hoc accountability. Again, 
we would argue that the disparity between England and Wales, and Scotland reflects the 
extensive discretion afforded by dint of these conditions; that a lack of clear rules around 
reasonable suspicion, officer conduct and recording further exacerbated the volume approach 
shown in part two. Added to this is the fact that until the move to a single police force in 
April 2013, the use of stop and search in Scotland was untroubled by political and public 
scrutiny. It is to this final issue that we now turn.   
 
 
4. Political and public scrutiny 
 
 
There is a marked difference between the politics of stop and search in England and Wales 
and Scotland, principally in regard to the maturity of the debate. In England and Wales, stop 
and search politics have evolved over three decades. Forged against a backdrop of brittle 
relationships between the police and BAME communities, the politics are now well-
established and marked by a demonstrable willingness to address issues – although the 
perennial nature of the complaints several decades on reflects, perhaps, an unwillingness to 
adopt radical change. In Scotland, it is only since the formation of the single service in April 
2014 that any semblance of accountability has emerged. The analysis below suggests that the 
divergence in search rates in the two jurisdictions also relates to the respective histories of 
political and public scrutiny. There are, of course, other relevant factors relating to scrutiny, 
notably the impact of the media, however, a full discussion of such issues are beyond the 




In England and Wales, the use of stop and search has been subject to scrutiny of varying 
intensity for over three decades. The 1981 Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure 
(RCCP), whose report provided the genesis of PACE, considered stop and search powers, 
alongside various other investigative police powers. It proposed that the existing powers be 
rationalised and subsumed within one power to stop and search for stolen goods or prohibited 
articles, arguing that ‘reasonable suspicion’ and requiring a record of each search provided 
sufficient safeguards against misuse (Philips 1981, paras.3.25-3.26). The recommendation 
took form as PACE, section 1 which, for many of the police forces, entailed an extension of 
their existing powers (Reiner 2010).  
 
Three months after the RCCP reported, the Brixton Riots erupted. The subsequent Scarman 
Report discussed stop and search in two brief paragraphs, arguing the powers were necessary 
to combat street crime and that an objective test of reasonableness, subject to review by the 
courts, provided a sufficient safeguard (Scarman 1981, paras.7.2-7.3). Given the interaction 
between stop and search, other street powers (notably ‘sus’) and police-community tensions, 
it is surprising that the Report did not subject the powers to greater analysis or engage with 
the arguments that the powers were used in a discriminatory manner (Bowling and Phillips 
2003 although c.f. Reiner 2010, pp. 163, 246 defending Scarman’s overall critique of 
discrimination by the police).  
 
The next significant scrutiny came with the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry (Macpherson 1999). 
While nominally limited to matters arising from the death of Stephen Lawrence and the 
investigation and prosecution of racially motivated crimes, a number of the Inquiry’s 
recommendations related to stop and search. The Inquiry pointed to the countrywide disparity 
in stop and search figures as one indicator of institutional racism, concluding that, while the 
figures raised complex issues, ‘there remains…a clear core conclusion of racist stereotyping’ 
(ibid., para.6.45). Its uncompromising tone and acknowledgment of the deep-seated police-
community tensions around the use of the powers, regarded as a ‘universal’ area of complaint 
(ibid., para.45.8), distinguish it from earlier reports. On its recommendation all stops and 
searches began to be recorded, not just those under PACE, and police authorities undertook 
publicity campaigns to inform the public of the relevant law and their rights (PACE (Codes 
of Practice) Order 2004, SI 2004/1887, APA 2009). As noted in part one, the report 
influenced the decision to prohibit non-statutory stops and searches or ‘so called ‘voluntary’ 
stops’ (Macpherson 1999, para.45.8). 
 
During the mid to late 2000s the use of the Terrorism Act 2000, s.44 became the most 
prominent issue (see Home Affairs Committee, 2005, Carlile, 2008, Joint Committee on 
Human Rights, 2009).  However, the next major report to tackle stop and search in general 
was the Equality and Human Rights Commission’s ‘Stop and Think’ (EHRC 2010). The 
Commission pointed to some areas of best practice but remained pessimistic, given the 
consistent racial disproportionality evident in the deployment of stop and search. The report 
rejected the various justificatory arguments as inadequate and suggested the powers may have 
been used in a discriminatory and unlawful manner. It subsequently held further inquiries into 
five forces, initiating legal action against two of these, with positive results in terms of 




Next, the Home Secretary commissioned the HMIC Report ‘Stop And Search Powers: Are 
The Police Using Them Effectively And Fairly?’ (2013), prompted in part by the 2011 riots. 
Its conclusions were damning, highlighting poor leadership, ineffective supervision, failure to 
adhere to recording requirements and the likelihood of a large number of stops without 
reasonable grounds. In terms of effectiveness, it concluded that ‘[v]ery few forces could 
demonstrate that use of stop and search powers were based on an understanding of what 
works best to cut crime’ (ibid., p.8). The HMIC made ten recommendations in relation to 
training, guidance on effective and fair use, supervision and monitoring of stops and stop 
forms, stop forms, complaints procedures, communication with the public, and the use of 
technology and processing intelligence.   
 
In 2014, while laying the responses to a public consultation on stop and search before 
Parliament, the Home Secretary announced a series of measures aimed at reducing the overall 
number of stops and searches and improving the hit-rate (May 2014). There were four main 
developments. First, the College of Policing reviewed its stop and search training, and 
published a definition of what a ‘fair and effective’ stop and search (2015). Second, PACE 
Code A was revised to clarify the meaning of ‘reasonable suspicion’. Third, stop and search 
was added to the Government’s crime maps and finally, the BUSS scheme was announced 
(see part two).   
 
In 2015, HMIC published a follow-up report that tracked the progress of forces against the 
ten recommendations from its 2013 report and added additional recommendations. It 
concluded that of the ten original recommendations, good progress had been made towards 
one, some progress towards four and insufficient progress towards the remainder. Finally, the 
HMIC’s PEEL inspections include a question whether stop and search decisions are fair and 
appropriate (2015a). This on-going scrutiny by the HMIC is a new departure and its latest 
report serves as a reminder of the challenges involved in changing policing cultures.   
 
Scotland 
In Scotland, scrutiny of stop and search is in its infancy. Looking back, divergence between 
the jurisdictions may be traced to the publication of the Macpherson report, which in regard 
to stop and search received a non-committal response in Scotland. The Association of Chief 
Police Officers in Scotland (ACPOS) Cross-standing Committee Working Group initially 
considered the recommendations (NAS HH41/3406, 27/9/1999). Viewed exclusively through 
the prism of ‘race’, and with no clear evidence of ethnic disproportionality, the Group 
deemed the introduction of accountability mechanisms for stop and search unwarranted.  
 
This logic subsequently fed into ‘The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry: Action Plan for Scotland’. 
Published by the Scottish Executive in July 1999, the plan stated that the stop search 
recommendations would require a ‘large bureaucracy to implement’ and noted a lack of 
criticism to date. Towards the end of 1999, a Scottish Executive appointed Steering Group 
commissioned an independent study into young people's experiences of stop and search, 
which makes for prescient reading. In addition to recommendations on recording, publishing 
statistics and making people aware of their rights, the researchers suggested that ACPOS 
provide guidance on searching children, and engage with the legal and civil liberties issues 
raised by non-statutory stop and search. Caution was advised over the use of performance 
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targets, and it was suggested ‘as a matter of urgency’, that all forces address ‘the perceived 
failure of some officers to interact routinely with members of black and minority ethnic 
communities’ (Reid Howie Associates 2002, p. 102). However, following the dissolution of 
the Steering Group in 2002, no initiatives were forthcoming. Prompted by the Race Relations 
(Amendment) Act 2000, Scottish forces began to record stop searches from 2005 onwards, 
but did not publish national statistics.   
 
Within the first year of Police Scotland, media reports began to pick up the scale of stop and 
search. In January 2014, the issue came to the fore following the publication of a report by 
the Scottish Centre for Crime and Justice Research (SCCJR) which revealed the scale of 
search activity, the extensive use of non-statutory stop and search, and the disproportionate 
targeting of young people (Murray 2014a). Published into a politicized and volatile policing 
climate, the report was met with a defensive response from the Scottish Government and 
Police Scotland, who asserted that high volume stop and search had significantly contributed 
to the fall in violent crime in Scotland, and represented a proportionate policing response 
(Guardian, 17/1/2014, SP Official Report 23/1/2014, col. 26968). In May 2014, the SPA’s 
‘Scrutiny Review’ of stop and search policy and practice challenged the Scottish Government 
and Police Scotland position. The Authority found ‘no robust evidence to prove a causal 
relationship between the level of stop and search activity and violent crime or anti-social 
behaviour’, nor could it ‘establish the extent to which use of the tactic contributes to a 
reduction in violence’ (2014, p. 17).  
 
Thereafter, against a backdrop of intense media and political scrutiny, Police Scotland 
announced a number of policy initiatives. These included: the establishment of a National 
Stop and Search Unit; the abolition of non-statutory searches on children aged eleven and 
under; a pilot scheme aimed at improving effectiveness, recording practices and community 
confidence; and the appointment of Expert Reference Groups to provide informed comment 
on policy development (HMICS, 2015). Whilst these changes prompted a fall in the number 
of searches on young children, in February 2015, it was revealed that some non-statutory 
searches were still being carried out on under twelves, despite a commitment to abolish the 
practice (BBC 4/2/2015). The ensuing scandal crystallized existing criticism of non-statutory 
stop and search by the Scottish Human Rights Commission, the Scottish Commissioner for 
Children and Young People and opposition MSPs. In response, the Scottish Government and 
Police Scotland announced their broad support for the abolition of non-statutory stop and 
search, with the proviso that ‘alternative measures’ would be considered, including search 
powers for alcohol. Shortly thereafter, in a move which signalled the first serious democratic 
engagement with wider regulation of stop and search powers, the Scottish Liberal Democrats 
tabled a series of amendments to the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Bill 2013 to place stop and 
search on an exclusively statutory footing, introduce a statutory code of practice, improve 
recording and require annual publication of data. 
 
In March 2015, HMICS reported that it had no confidence in Police Scotland’s stop and 
search data; that training was limited; that targets, key performance indicators and pressure 
from managers to carry out searches had resulted in negative behaviours; and that the internal 
governance processes were unclear. Echoing the SPA, the HMIC noted a lack of evidence to 
support a causal relationship between search rates and crime reduction. Key 
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recommendations included consultation on a Statutory Code of Practice; a presumption 
towards the use of statutory powers; clear counting rules; and improved recording 
procedures. Thereafter, the Scottish Government (31/3/2015) appointed an Independent 
Advisory Group to examine the use of stop and search powers. Both the Group’s remit and 
the appointment of John Scott QC, solicitor advocate and human rights lawyer, as Chair, 
signalled a major shift by the Scottish government, which under the previous Justice 
Secretary, had viewed stop and search as an ‘operational matter’ (2/4/2014 MacAskill, SP 
Official Report col. 29702). In September, following the publication of the Independent 
Advisory Group report (Scott 2015), the Justice Secretary, Michael Matheson, announced 
that non-statutory stop and search would end and that the Scottish Parliament would establish 
a Statutory Code of Practice. At the time of writing, both proposals have been added to the 
Criminal Justice (Scotland) Bill which is currently under consideration by the Scottish 
Parliament.   
 
Looking back, the absence of significant or sustained scrutiny into stop and search in 
Scotland undoubtedly fed into the permissive and unregulated approach to the powers. By the 
same token, the degree of critical scrutiny following reform prompted tighter rules and 
regulation, and a fall in search levels. In addition to formal scrutiny by the SPA and HMICS, 
critical media attention placed further pressure on Police Scotland and the Scottish 
Government. With coverage no longer diluted along regional lines, stop and search surfaced 
as a national policing ‘scandal’ that tapped into wider concerns around a lack of local 
accountability and a target culture (Murray 2015a p. 322). By August 2015, the number of 
recorded searches and seizures had fallen by 81% compared to the same period in the 
previous year. Of these, 25% were non-statutory and 75% statutory, more than a reversal of 
the long-standing ratio between the two types of searches (Police Scotland 2015).  
 
Conclusion 
The findings in this paper provide an example of how regulation and scrutiny can influence 
police practice. To begin, the paper argued that the variation in search rates between England 
and Wales, and Scotland is not explicable in terms of statutory powers or crime trends, which 
are broadly similar. Looking back, the analysis suggests a target-driven proactive policy, 
based on volume rather than detection, initiated the rise of stop and search in Scotland. 
Whilst some forces retained a reactive, suspicion-led approach, the volume of searches in 
Strathclyde drove up the national search rate. The salient observation for our purposes is that 
this approach was enabled by a permissive regulatory environment: by the ability to search on 
a non-statutory basis, poor accountability, and a lack of scrutiny and oversight. Whilst an 
emphasis on performance was evident in England and Wales, principally in the Metropolitan 
police, comparative analysis suggests that police discretion was, to some extent, tempered by 
legal and quasi-legal rules and regulations. Recorded search rates in England and Wales rose 
by 84% between 2003/4 and 2008/9, compared to a 325% increase in Scotland in the nearest 
comparable six year period (2005 to 2010). The paper also provides insights into the role of 
scrutiny. In England and Wales, a series of legal challenges prompted a sharp fall in 
suspicionless statutory searches. In Scotland, an unprecedented degree of media and political 




In terms of future research, the findings underline the need, as recognised by others such as 
Delsol and Shiner (2006), to broaden the scope of enquiry around stop and search. Although 
this paper focuses on Great Britain, globally stop and search is often viewed through the lens 
of ‘race’ and/or ethnicity (Weber and Bowling 2012). In the case of Scotland, it is perverse 
that the absence of one form of disproportionality was used to avoid, in an example of 
Nelsonian blindness, acknowledging other flaws in the practice. The lens through which stop 
and search is scrutinised needs to be widened beyond ‘race’. One could view the various 
groups (and sub-groups) that are subjected to greater levels of stop and search as falling 
within Lee’s broad category of ‘police property’ (1981, pp. 53-4). Discovering which 
characteristics of each group makes them susceptible will require researchers to disentangle 
the multiple direct and indirect discriminations suffered by the communities or groups, 
whether cumulatively or intersectionally. Disaggregation would permit a closer investigation 
of the origins of disproportionality and could highlight areas where accountability can, and 
should be, strengthened. Analysis may also reveal under-researched commonalities. For 
instance, it is clear that young males bear the brunt of stop and search in England and Wales, 
and Scotland. Socio-economic status is another likely common thread (see further Loftus 
2009). Whilst this approach has been taken before (Jefferson and Walker 1992), stop and 
search remains principally viewed through the lens of ‘race’. In this regard, the findings are 
relevant beyond the geographical focus presented here. Specifically the findings show how 
such a framing can overlook other examples of disproportionality, as well as issues of 
accountability and effectiveness more generally. A broader focus on intersectional 
disproportionality is urgently needed, alongside a more general focus on accountability over 
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